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UNDERSTANDING 
THE RESOURCE 
CURSE:
Why Some Get More 
Sick Than Others
Tire 
Gina Mason
Countries rich in natural resources often suffer 
from the “resource curse”: negative effects that 
high reserves of these resources have on economic, 
political and social institutions. Although richness 
in oil is presumed to bring national prosperity, 
at times it is detrimental to the country due to 
corruption and overdependence on petroleum 
revenues. This study seeks to understand how some 
countries manage this curse better than others by 
examining the varied experiences of three of the 
world’s largest oil-exporting countries: Venezuela, 
Nigeria and Kazakhstan.
by Karen Timmerman
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“Ten years from now, twenty years 
from now, you will see: oil will 
bring us ruin…Oil is the Devil’s 
excrement.” 
T he Venezuelan co-creator of OPEC, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo made this statement at a time when Venezuela’s economy was booming and 
the revenues were flowing in due to the 
high oil prices of 1973, and so his com-
ment seemed out of place.
 However, Alfonzo had made a star-
tlingly accurate prediction for the future; 
in the many decades since the first discov-
ery of oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania, to 
where so many had rushed for the chance 
at profiting from this new lucrative busi-
ness, the world has seen the economies 
and institutions of some major oil-export-
ing countries falter and fail because of 
an increasing reliance on oil revenues to 
run the nation. This inverse relationship 
between dependence on natural resource 
exports and the economic growth rate of 
a region is known by many names, includ-
ing the paradox of plenty, the “devil’s ex-
crement,” and the resource curse.1 Though 
its impacts can be devastating on the econ-
omies and livelihoods of oil-exporting 
nations, the resource curse does not affect 
every oil-producing country in the world. 
There have been many countries through-
out history, such as Australia and Norway, 
who depend on the export of single-point 
natural resources such as oil for revenues 
but have not been afflicted by the negative 
consequences of the resource curse. In 
this paper I shall examine the resource 
curse and the impact it has had on three 
of the world’s largest petroleum exporters: 
Venezuela, Nigeria and Kazakhstan. These 
three nations, each the largest petroleum 
exporter within its region, suffer from this 
resource curse to some extent but with 
vastly different causes and consequences. I 
wish to compare the impact of oil revenue 
dependence on each country’s economy 
and social and political institutions, and 
I will attempt to explain the differences 
in both the severity and causes of the re-
source curse in each case. I will also pres-
ent the steps that each country has taken, 
if any, in an effort to reduce and reverse 
the consequences of their overdependence 
on the substance that makes the world go 
round.
The Resource Curse
Before analyzing its effects, the resource 
curse must be defined. The increased 
reliance on revenues from oil exports by 
countries that suffer from this paradox of 
plenty is harming their economies and 
populations so much that, if not checked, 
it could ultimately lead to civil strife and 
war. I shall characterize the resource curse 
using the explanations posited by Terry 
Lynn Karl, one of the forefront scholars on 
the idea of the paradox of plenty. She de-
fines the resource curse as the “inverse re-
lationship between high natural resource 
dependence and economic growth rate.”2 
In addition to examining the economics 
of the resource curse, Lynn also focuses 
on the “social and political relations aris-
ing from [the] utilization [of oil].”3 The 
immense wealth that oil exploitation can 
bring may cause the political and social 
institutional structures to change in a way 
that negatively affects the economy. The 
focus of this paper is on the export of the 
point source nonrenewable natural re-
source that is oil: a black, sticky substance 
that went from being used as a lubricant, 
a light source and even as a weapon in 
medieval wars to the liquid that has 
pushed globalization to a new level and 
has opened up a vast world economy. In 
an age where the demand for oil is grow-
ing every day, large oil reserves are seen as 
enormous assets for the countries they are 
found in. In 2011 global consumption had 
increased the most since 2004, up by 3.1% 
to 87.4 million barrels a day, with the most 
rapid of growth occurring in developing 
countries.4 The reliance on fuel of nations 
such as China and India to connect their 
emerging markets around the world will 
only increase in the years to come, putting 
pressure on oil exporters to meet this de-
mand without succumbing to the paradox 
of plenty. 
 The resource curse has several different 
causes and effects that each contribute in 
different ways to the growing dependence 
on oil rents, which cause poor economic 
growth and decreases efficiency of social 
and political institutions. The explana-
tions include the change in the role of the 
government towards the market, especial-
ly after nationalizing part or the whole of 
their oil industry and the increasing power 
of elites and interest groups who use the 
oil rents to keep their positions. These 
changes have a number of negative effects 
such as the distorted economic growth 
characterized by Dutch Disease and the 
increasing difference in economic income 
that forces a majority of the population 
into poverty. 
 The first explanation of the resource 
curse is the change in the role of the state 
towards the market. Revenues from oil 
exports are received by the state in the 
form of royalties and rents from foreign 
companies or taxes and profits from 
state-owned companies. These revenues 
give the state less incentive to establish a 
system of taxation on their people, taking 
away some accountability for government 
spending. Because the state is receiving its 
money directly from the oil trade, it does 
not feel the need to show budget transpar-
ency for the general population, as the 
money belongs to the state, which leaves 
more room for corrupt spending. In order 
to pacify the people, the government will 
embark on massive infrastructure projects 
and increase social welfare, relying on oil 
rents to fund everything. 
 The elites and interest groups who are 
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in control will also use oil rents to rein-
force their place in society in order to reap 
the benefits. The state begins to exhibit 
rent-seeking behavior in order to maintain 
the status quo of the regime and to accrue 
the short-term benefits of oil exploitation. 
This increased reliance on oil rents to fund 
projects and fuel corruption can have 
disastrous effects on a state’s economy, 
especially with the world’s fluctuating oil 
prices.
 Due to events and wars occurring 
throughout the world, oil prices can be 
very volatile at times, with the West Texas 
Intermediate price for a barrel rising from 
$41.51 in 2004 to $99.67 in 2008, and 
then falling back down to $61.95 in 2009.5 
Oil exporting countries that sometimes 
depend on exports for up to 90% of their 
GDP can see great periods of profitability 
during booms turn into economic trends 
that take a turn for the worse when de-
mand drops and prices fall. A government 
could set its yearly budget according to 
predicted oil prices, but there is always the 
chance that prices could fall and the previ-
ous surplus could turn into a deficit. 
 The rent-seeking behavior of the state 
can also have harmful consequences for 
the domestic economy. A major result 
of the social and political institutional 
changes that the resource curse can cause 
is known as “Dutch Disease.” This phe-
nomenon is seen when all non-oil exports 
are rendered both domestically and inter-
nationally non-competitive due to rising 
exchange rates. An abundance of natural 
resources gives a country easy access to 
large revenues and growth, but ignores 
the development of other sectors of the 
economy. Countries that once depended 
upon agriculture for a large percentage of 
their exports may suddenly find it cheaper 
to import their food from another country. 
The government may place subsidies and 
taxes on these industries in a protectionist 
attempt, but this merely serves to continue 
to decrease competitiveness and also plac-
es an additional burden on the oil sector 
to provide funds for these policies. If not 
reversed, Dutch disease can become per-
petuating, “provok[ing] a rapid, even dis-
torted, growth of services, transportation, 
and other non-tradeables while simultane-
ously discouraging industrialization and 
agriculture,” which could eventually lead 
the economy to collapse.6 
 In addition to the dominance of oil in 
the export sector, rent-seeking behavior 
causes the income gap to increase and 
poverty levels to rise due to the capital- 
and education-intensive characteristics 
of the oil industry. This can be explained 
through the rent cycling theory. This idea 
compares the differences between the ef-
fects of low and high oil rent revenues. In 
a low rent model, the incentive to create 
wealth is highly prevalent because the gov-
ernment relies less on oil rents to sustain 
itself and thus must invest in growing its 
economy by other means. Dutch Disease 
is not affecting the competitiveness of 
non-oil and labor-intensive manufactured 
goods, and so the government will expand 
these sectors, which in turn increases the 
diversification of the economy and de-
creases income inequality. There will be a 
higher demand for domestic skilled labor 
and the increase in productivity can lead 
to innovation for the future. By contrast, 
in a high rent model the profits from oil 
exploitation are received and dispersed of 
in large amounts very quickly in order to 
gain maximum short-term benefits. The 
money is spent in frivolous and corrupt 
ways on costly projects and to keep the 
elites in the political power positions they 
hold. With the oil industry as capital and 
technologically intensive as it is, few jobs 
are created, and poor funding for educa-
tional systems leaves a population of rural 
laborers watching the distance between 
high and low income increase as foreign 
workers are hired by oil companies and 
education is completed in foreign coun-
tries. The rent-seeking sector, by making 
poor investments and not bothering to 
correctly jumpstart the economy “cor-
rodes the viability of the primary sector 
upon which it increasingly depends.”7 In 
addition, a government may also invest 
little back into research and innovation in 
the oil industry, over time decreasing pro-
duction levels and efficiency.
 The high level of foreign workers and 
low domestic employment is also a result 
of the presence of foreign companies since 
the beginnings of a nation’s oil history. 
Most oil-exporting countries lacked the 
technical skill and capital to extract and 
refine oil from their fields, and thus out-
side companies were awarded concessions 
and employed their own workers to ex-
tract the precious natural resource. When 
the oil industry took off, it caused a rise in 
the wages of the few employed by the oil 
industry which left the rest of the popula-
tion out of work and watching their na-
tion’s resources be controlled by foreigners. 
For these reasons, especially due to poor 
economic management by the government, 
the population of an affected country may 
become very disgruntled with the way 
oil rents are being spent, and this could 
lead to increased violence and even war. 
As the majority of the population sinks 
In an age where the demand for oil is 
growing every day, large oil reserves are 
seen as enormous assets for the countries 
they are found in. 
into poverty and the per capita income of 
the country plummets, a small minority 
reaps the benefits of the nation’s oil fields. 
If the government does not become fully 
accountable for their people or provide 
budget and revenue transparency for their 
financial transactions, the population may 
rise up against the elites in the form of at-
tacks on individuals and oil infrastructure, 
terrorism, and even civil wars and coups. 
 Countries that suffer from an overde-
pendence on oil export revenues will see 
different levels of severity of the resource 
curse depending on how the country is 
run. I shall examine the effects of the re-
source curse on the countries of Venezuela, 
Nigeria and Kazakhstan and compare 
the three in order to explain the reasons 
for the variance in the intensity of the re-
source curse and its effects.
Venezuela
At the end of 2010, Venezuela was the 
largest producer of petroleum in South 
America and the ninth largest producer in 
the world, with a 15.3% share of the total 
proven world reserves.8 This country has 
had a long history with oil; discovered in 
1914 at the Mene Grande field, the natural 
resource was first seen in production for 
export in 1917, with Royal Dutch Shell 
and Standard Oil as the major players in 
its extraction and refinement. Oil’s share 
of exports rose dramatically from 1.9% 
to 91.2% between 1920 and 1935 and by 
1929 Venezuela was the world’s largest oil 
exporter.9 In 1926, oil had surpassed the 
value of coffee and other agricultural com-
modities to become the most important 
export to the Venezuelan economy. This is 
a perfect example of Dutch Disease; with 
oil taking over as the major export, and a 
lucrative one at that, by 1940 the Venezue-
lan government found it cheaper to import 
their food rather than to rely on their once 
strong agricultural sector.10 The apprecia-
tion of the bolívar in relation to the U.S. 
dollar encouraged a growth in the import 
sector of Venezuela while neglecting 
traditional domestic sectors such as the 
agriculture industry. By 1950, agricultural 
exports comprised of less than one-tenth 
of the country’s GDP.11 
 In 1943, the Fifty-Fifty Agreement was 
pushed for by Venezuela, who wanted to 
see royalties and taxes “raised to the point 
at which the government’s take would 
about equal the companies’ [Royal Dutch/
Shell and Jersey] net profits in Venezu-
ela.”12 At the same time, the Hydrocarbons 
Act was passed, giving the government 
greater control over oil revenues. This 
Act established a new income tax on the 
mining industry in order to fund the 
many recently created state agencies. This 
revolutionized oil revenues for the Ven-
ezuelan government; rather than handing 
out concessions in return for a chunk of 
the profits the state could now determine 
how much of a cut it would take, and the 
fact that the money came from oil rather 
than from taxing the citizens meant that 
the state could be a bit more secretive with 
their spending. The foreign oil companies 
went from the ones in control to a posi-
tion in which they had to comply with the 
national government, lest they risk being 
thrown out of the business. For the next 
ten years, Venezuela witnessed a surge 
in production while at the same time 
spent millions of dollars on the import 
of consumer goods from countries such 
as the United States. Pérez Jiménez, who 
ruled Venezuela from 1948 to 1957, used 
this influx of oil to his advantage. Jiménez 
reduced social expenditures and poured 
the oil revenues into projects of his own, 
causing the economy to drop due to un-
necessary expenditures and overspending. 
Public outrage at his poor fiscal policies 
was increasingly mounting as Venezuela 
headed towards massive debt. 
 In 1958, Jimenéz was overthrown in 
a coup and Venezuela became a democ-
racy. Karl defines the type of democracy 
present in Venezuela as a “pacted democ-
racy,” which she describes as “established 
through elite bargains and compromises…
[that] ensure their survival by selectively 
meeting demands while limiting the scope 
of representation in order to reassure 
traditional dominant classes that their 
vital interests will be respected.”13 This 
form of democracy impacted Venezuela’s 
dependence on petroleum in several ways; 
rigid political institutions were produced 
that kept barriers to admittance high, so 
that the elites in power positions could 
continue to keep their place and use oil 
rents for their own purposes. However, 
large amounts of social spending occurred 
in order to pacify and provide jobs for 
the working class. This social spending, 
which includes spending on education, 
health, and housing among other sectors, 
increased from 11.4% under Jiménez to 
a much higher 31.4% of total spending 
in 1973.14 Despite this, by 1973 there was 
much discontent apparent in the popula-
tion. The political parties and government 
were highly centralized, leaving little 
room for newcomers and limiting repre-
sentation, and the economy was balanced 
in the direct of the few wealthy elite. 
 In the mid-1950s, the rises in produc-
tion in the Middle East and import con-
trols in the United States led to a flooding 
of the markets, and prices plummeted, 
along with Venezuela’s oil revenues. Juan 
Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, Venezuela’s Minister 
of Mines and Hydrocarbons at the time, 
had realized the imminent dangers of 
the resource curse; he got together with 
Abdullah al-Tariki of Saudi Arabia and 
founded the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries in 1960. OPEC was 
an attempt by the world’s largest oil-ex-
porting countries to, through the imposi-
tion of export quotas, coordinate policies 
and keep world prices stable in such a 
volatile and ever-changing market. 
 The First Oil Shock in 1973, a result of 
the fourth Arab-Israeli War and the Arab 
oil embargo, sent oil prices skyrocketing, 
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increasing Venezuela’s fiscal income per 
barrel of exported oil from $1.65 to $9.68 
between 1972 and 1975. This led to mas-
sive increases in government spending.15 
When Carlos Andrés Pérez of the Acción 
Democratica party won Presidency in 
1973, he began to implement his plans for 
La Gran Venezuela, which consisted of 
income increases and job creation along 
with a push to diversify exports through 
the expansion and nationalization of other 
industries. However, most of the jobs cre-
ated were for the national government, 
which doubled in the first five years of his 
rule, calling for an increase in petrodol-
lars to fund their wages. Pérez also called 
for the nationalism of the oil industry and 
succeeded in 1976 when the newly cre-
ated state-owned oil company known as 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) took 
over concessions of foreign companies.16 
At this time in history, Venezuela and the 
other OPEC and non-OPEC countries 
were profiting greatly from the high prices 
of the first oil shock. Carlos Pérez seized 
this moment to complete his vision of a 
modern and industrialized Venezuela 
fueled by the large amounts of incoming 
oil rents. There was also a rise in wages 
and new employment opportunities in 
oil-exporting countries, which increased 
consumption at a rate of 7% between 
1970 and 1979. Despite the expulsion of 
most foreign workers from Venezuela’s 
oil industry however, only about 37,000 
jobs were provided to the domestic labor 
force.17 By the late 1970s, on the eve of the 
coming oil glut, the surpluses turned into 
deficits. Spending has grown out of con-
trol, and during the 1980s oil glut, a result 
of declining consumption due to the high 
prices of the oil shocks and over-quota 
production from OPEC countries, prices 
dropped to $13.00 per barrel in 1986 and 
Venezuela’s oil revenues fell with them, 
putting Venezuela into massive debt, with 
“the ratio of debt to GNP reach[ing]… [a] 
high of 65.3 percent” in 1987.18
 In 1974, the Venezuelan Investment 
Fund was created to accumulate oil 
revenue and foreign exchange reserves. 
However, the government also saw the 
fund as a bank for their large public sector 
projects. Although the Fund did accrue a 
modest amount of income, rather than be-
ing used fully to improve the economy and 
lives of Venezuela’s citizens, the Fund was 
“an executor of the government’s plans and 
wishes,” meaning that oil was still being 
used for wasteful projects and corrup-
tion.19 
 Between 1970 and 1994, foreign debt 
increased to 53% of GNP from 9% as a 
result of poor fiscal policies in Perez’s gov-
ernment.20 The increased revenues of the 
oil booms of the 1970s were used to fund 
social spending and massive infrastruc-
ture projects that had been budgeted poor-
ly and ended up being enormous wastes of 
petrodollars. Wanting to increase spend-
ing come election season but faced with a 
lack of funds due to debt, the Pérez gov-
ernment relied upon floating debt, which 
did not have to be recorded in any official 
manner. This allowed for an augmentation 
in government spending, for which float-
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ing loans accounted for $10 billion. These 
short-term, high-interest loans, combined 
with increasing interest rates and a falter-
ing economy, catapulted Venezuela’s debt 
to 69.7% of GNP by 1989.21 In exchange 
for new loans, the Venezuelan government 
eliminated many non-tariff barriers, cut 
subsidies and increased the domestic price 
of petroleum. This caused an uprising by 
the people of Venezuela, who rioted in 
the capitol of Caracas in February of 1989. 
Pérez’s plan backfired; wages dropped 
as unemployment and inflation rose to 
unprecedented levels, ushering in an at-
tempted coup in 1992. 
 Hugo Chávez was elected President in 
1998 and three years later passed a series 
of laws aimed at strengthening govern-
ment control over PDVSA. This was met 
with a great amount of resistance and 
in April 2002 PDVSA employee went 
on strike, to which Chávez responded 
by firing executives and cleaning house. 
Production levels decreased and the oil 
industry was producing at one-third of 
its normal levels. Violence struck in 2002 
when an attempted forty-eight-hour coup 
occurred, and although Chávez quickly 
came back to power, protests in Miraflores 
left nineteen dead and many more injured, 
and it has since been suspected that pro-
Chávez forces may be to blame.22
The GINI index, which measures income 
inequality on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 
representing prefect equality, gave Venezu-
ela a 41 in 2009, down from 49.5 in 1998, 
which is still a very negative rating.23
The effects of the resource curse in Ven-
ezuela seem to be caused by rent-seeking 
behavior and poor government spending 
of oil rents. Dutch Disease is rampant, 
with the once flourishing agricultural 
sector taking a back seat to oil exports. Al-
though the Venezuelan government seems 
to put a lot of revenue into public spending 
projects, many end up being ineffective 
and costly. Venezuela’s case of the resource 
curse needs to be cured before it spins fur-
ther out of control.
Nigeria
Nigeria is a country that in this day is 
filled with poverty, disease and violence 
that upon closer inspection can point to 
the resource curse as a large factor in these 
negative aspects.
 Nigeria gained independence from Brit-
ain in 1960 and the new government had 
the role of unifying a nation that had over 
250 ethnic and linguistic groups. In 1966 a 
military coup put Colonel Yakubu Gowon 
in power, which caused Christian Ibos in 
the east to declare independence from Ni-
geria, sparking a civil war in 1967. In 1975, 
another coup put Army Brig. Muritala 
Mohammad in charge and civilian lead-
ership was put into control in 1979, with 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari elected as president. 
Because of the variation of regimes in such 
a short time, the economy of Nigeria did 
not fare well. 
 Into the oil booms of the 1970s and the 
early 1980s, Nigeria enjoyed an improving 
economy and the push for more democra-
cy. However, symptoms of Dutch Disease 
were beginning to present themselves as 
agriculture’s share of GDP dropped form 
68% in 1965 to 35% in 1981 while the gov-
ernment invested heavily in services and 
manufacturing.24 In addition, government 
investment in the manufacturing sector 
demonstrated a waste of at least two-thirds 
of oil revenues, with only 35% of capacity 
utilization in manufacturing investment 
in the mid-1980s.25 
 In 1984 a series of military coups began 
again, leaving the Nigerian government 
open to much corruption until 1999, when 
free presidential elections led to a victory 
for General Olusegun Obasanjo, who was 
committed to eliminating corruption and 
promoting democracy in Nigeria. 
 The Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People, led by Nigerian activist Ken 
Saro-Wiwa protested against the govern-
ment and Royal Dutch/Shell in the 1990s 
because of the lack of benefits from oil rev-
enues given to the Ogoni people and the 
massive environmental damage caused by 
oil extraction. In 1992 the Movement de-
manded over $10 billion in previous royal-
ties and damages from Shell, Chevron and 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Country 
as well as rioted in the streets, causing oil 
production to slow to 10,000 bbl/d as Shell 
removed all employees from Ogoniland.  
In 1994, four Ogoni chiefs were murdered 
and the Nigerian government placed the 
blame on Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight oth-
ers, executing them in 1995 to the protests 
of the international community. In 2009, 
Shell reached a $15.5 million settlement 
with the relatives of the Ogoni nine, who 
claimed that the oil company had aided 
and collaborated with the Nigerian gov-
ernment in the murder of Saro-Wiwa.26 
 The Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND) is one of the 
largest insurgent groups in the area and 
in 2006 was involved in the kidnapping 
of foreign oil workers. The group has con-
tinued to kidnap and stage attacks on oil 
While Nigeria has had the potential to 
drastically improve its economy and living 
situation by taking advantage of revenues 
from petroleum exports, it instead has 
neglected the majority of the people. 
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pipelines in order to protest the lack of de-
velopment and distribution of oil revenues 
to the Delta region as well as the immense 
environmental degradation caused by oil 
exploitation. A 2007 report by the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations found that “in 
2003, some 70 percent of oil revenues was 
stolen or wasted, according to an estimate 
by the head of Nigeria’s anticorruption 
agency.”27 In retaliation, militant groups 
such as MEND engage in kidnapping and 
oil bunkering, in which they tap pipelines 
and steal crude oil to sell on the market. 
The group insists that the government give 
50% of the oil revenues from the Niger 
Delta back to its people and declare they 
will not stop attacks until this happens. 
 President Goodluck Jonathan took over 
in 2010 after his predecessor died and won 
again in 2011. As Vice President in 2008, 
he was quoted as saying that “the over-
dependence on oil has put an unpleasant 
bracket in [Nigeria’s] national economic 
freedom.”28 Currently, Nigeria is the larg-
est oil producer in Africa and the tenth 
largest in the world, with the oil sector 
compromising 78% of total revenues, 
while the non-oil sector holds only 15%. 
From 1990 to 2000, Nigeria’s annual per-
centage growth of GDP was a mere 2.4%, 
worse even than Ghana, who had averaged 
4.3%. The GINI index gave Nigeria a score 
of 43.7 in 2011, down from a high of 50.6 
in 2006.29
 In 1999, President Obasanjo set up two 
agencies in order to increase transparency 
and reduce corruption. The first was the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and the 
Related Offences Commission, the duty 
of which was to receive and investigate 
complaints, taking legal action if neces-
sary. The second agency was the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission, which 
was established with the purpose of root-
ing out corruption among the government 
and elites in Nigeria. The EFCC estimates 
that between 1960 and 1999 over $400 bil-
lion was stolen in oil revenues by the coun-
try’s rulers, which is equivalent to the total 
aid sent to Africa in this time period.30
 While Nigeria has had the potential to 
drastically improve its economy and living 
situation by taking advantage of revenues 
from petroleum exports, it instead has 
neglected the majority of the people. Only 
36% of the Nigerian population is esti-
mated to have access to electricity, while 
the rest generate it themselves or live with-
out.31 Like Venezuela, Nigeria has no need 
for much human capital as the oil industry 
is very technically intensive. It is ranked 
91st in Newsweek’s study of the World’s 
Best Countries, with a dismal grade of 
65.54 in education, and also ranks around 
the 90s in health, quality of life, economic 
dynamism, and political environment.32
 Wikileaks released a summary on 
Nigeria’s governmental corruption and 
the health of the president as reported by 
Shell’s executive vice president for Africa 
Ann Pickard. She spoke of the increasing 
problems Shell had hiring oil tankers, as in 
2009 there were eighty incidents of piracy 
in Nigeria. Piracy has become a huge prob-
lem in the Niger Delta, with an oil tanker 
being seized a little over a month ago so 
attackers could take its oil. She reported 
instances of oil buyers paying members of 
the National Petroleum Corporation and 
the Nigeria government bribes to lift oil.33 
 Oil rents have had a large impact on 
the Nigerian economy and livelihood of 
its people and out of those studied in this 
paper, this country seems to suffer the 
worst from the resource curse. The govern-
ment is clearly deeply involved in the oil 
industry, using revenues for corrupt prac-
tices and eliminating anyone that stands 
in their way. The suspicious execution of 
the Ogoni nine and Shell’s later settle-
ment with their families shows how the 
Nigerian government and oil companies 
will take extreme measures to secure their 
interests in the area. The people of the Ni-
ger Delta live in extreme poverty and see 
none of the benefits and solely the damage 
from the exploitation of the oil fields in 
their land. The insurgent groups fighting 
the government and international oil com-
panies only exacerbate the ethical and re-
ligious tensions in this diverse nation, and 
attacks on pipelines and workers threaten 
oil production. In order to reach optimal 
production in this world of increasing de-
mand, the Nigerian government must real-
ize that their citizens are in desperate need 
of a change. This nation can no longer run 
for the few at the expense of many.
Kazakhstan
Unlike the previous two countries, Ka-
zakhstan has exhibited much more pru-
dent behavior when it comes to the oil 
revenues it accrues. Kazakhstan has the 
both the second-largest reserves and pro-
duction capacity in all of the former Soviet 
Republics.34 With the development of its 
three largest fields, Tengiz, Karachaganak 
and Kashsgan, Kazakhstan has the poten-
tial to become one of the world’s top five 
producers. At the end of 2010, Kazakhstan 
had proven reserves of 38.9 thousand mil-
lion barrels at 2.9% of the world total and 
9th in ranking.35 The Tengiz, which lies 
along the northeast chores of the Caspian 
Sea, was discovered in 1979 and is Ka-
zakhstan’s largest producing field. It pro-
duced 492,000 bbl/d of crude oil in 2009 
and has been in development since 1993, 
when a forty-year joint venture between 
Chevron and the state-owned KazMunay-
Gas was created that later became known 
as Tengizchevroil when it expanded into 
a four-company consortium in 1997. Its 
sister field, Kashagan, is an offshore field 
found in the north of the Caspian Sea. It is 
being developed by an international con-
sortium called North Caspian Operating 
Company and has estimated reserves of 
eleven billion barrels of oil.36
 Before it declared its independence in 
1991, Kazakhstan had spent the majority 
of the twentieth century as a republic of 
the Soviet Union. Its industrial sector con-
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sisted of large enterprises that were inter-
dependent with businesses in other USSR 
regions, and the breakup of the Soviet 
Union left much of Kazakhstan’s industry 
useless. After the collapse of the USSR, 
newly elected President Nursultan Naz-
arbayev focused much of the state’s efforts 
on developing the economy of Kazakhstan. 
Due to Kazakhstan’s marginalized role 
in the economy of the Soviet Union, this 
new country was left with an underde-
veloped economy. However, Kazakhstan 
had a resource that could potentially push 
the economy skyward or drive it into the 
ground: oil. 
 Even though Kazakhstan’s oil fields had 
opened up to the world in a time when 
the majority of oil companies were state-
owned due to the 50-50 Agreements of the 
past, this Caspian Sea country had priva-
tized much of the petroleum sector and 
opened up its fields to foreign investors. 
This was due to the lack of another source 
of export revenues beside oil and the lack 
of technical and managerial skills needed 
to develop the oil industry, which ush-
ered in the joint venture of Chevron and 
KazMunaiGaz to manage the Tengiz field. 
The country also signed two production-
sharing agreements with international 
companies to develop the Kashagan oil 
deposit and Karachagnak field, with the 
state-owned company KazMunaiGaz 
holding shares in each.
 At the turn of the twenty-first century, 
the Kazakh government began to venture 
towards a more protective stance towards 
the energy sector. Rising oil prices had 
spurred economic growth, and the gov-
ernment of Kazakhstan was ready to take 
on a larger role in the petroleum indus-
try. In 2004 it changed its tax structure, 
increasing the government’s share of oil 
revenues to 65-85% by including an excess 
profit tax and imposing a new tax on im-
ports and limiting foreign companies to a 
maximum of 50% participation in projects. 
The new tax laws also gave the government 
rights to purchase shares in any energy 
project, allowing the state to legitimately 
purchase part of British Gas’s share in 
Kashagan production and bid for 33% of 
the Canadian-based PetroKazakhstan. 
This gave KazMunaiGaz a larger role in 
the participation of the state-owned com-
pany as both an investor and a partner.37 
In 2007 President Nazarbayev amended 
the “Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use,” giv-
ing the government the right to change or 
revoke national resource contracts if they 
were deemed to be a threat to national se-
curity. In 2008, Tax Codes were proposed 
that replaced royalties with a mineral ex-
traction tax, rent taxes with export duties, 
and announced that there would be no 
future production-sharing agreements.38 
However, the bulk of future oil production 
predicted for the future would take place 
in fields under production-sharing agree-
ments, such as those in Kashagan and Ka-
rachagnak. 
 In 2001 the National Fund for the Re-
public of Kazakhstan was created with 
the purpose of negating the impact of 
volatile oil prices on the economy and to 
save a significant chunk of the oil revenues 
for future generations. It is owned by the 
Ministry of Finance and is managed by 
the National Bank of Kazakhstan, who 
keeps 75% of the Fund’s assets in a sta-
bilization portfolio in the form of liquid 
assets and 25% in savings in the form of 
high return long-term securities.39 All 
revenues from oil exports first go to this 
fund, and from there a specified amount 
known as the annual guaranteed transfer 
is put into the state budget. In order to 
avoid sucking the Fund dry, it is stipu-
lated that no more than one-third of the 
Fund’s total assets may be withdrawn at 
once and that the budget must be used for 
development projects. Between 2001 and 
2008, the National Fund grew to $13.7 bil-
lion from $1.345 billion. In the early years 
of the decade, Kazakhstan was running 
under a very tight fiscal policy, diverting 
about 79% of revenues to the Fund. In 
the mid-2000s, Kazakhstan began us-
ing the development funds to improve 
infrastructure and support agricultural 
development in an attempt to boost the 
economy. Many national funds were cre-
ated, including the National Innovative 
Fund and the Small Business Develop-
ment Fund, in an attempt to diversify the 
economy.  At this time tax reforms took 
place, which reduced taxes for the non-oil 
industries in an attempt to diversify the 
economy. High oil prices towards the end 
of the decade meant that 86% of revenues 
could go to the Fund with a large chunk 
of profits going towards investments in 
education and welfare. Indeed, in the 2010 
study by Newsweek of the world’s best 
countries, Kazakhstan received a 91.35 in 
education, ranking 14th on earth.40 The 
National Fund of Kazakhstan is one fac-
tor in the fight against the resource curse; 
by saving the majority of oil revenues as 
public assets and using approved transfers 
for non-oil economic developments, Ka-
zakhstan largely avoided the symptoms of 
Dutch Disease and did not suffer the large 
income inequality that can clearly be seen 
in Venezuela and Nigeria.
 In 2006, the Kazyna Sustainable De-
velopment Fund was created with the aim 
of increasing industrial competition and 
diversity through innovative economic 
development. The Samruk State Holding 
Company was also created at this time in 
order to enhance the accountability and 
efficiency of asset management by the state. 
The two joined together in 2008 to become 
Samruk-Kazyna Welfare Fund, a 100% 
state-owned holding company that con-
solidates the majority of the state-owned 
enterprises in Kazakhstan.41 The creation 
of this Fund was required as a result of 
the 2007 financial crisis and its impact on 
the Kazakh economy. In the mid-2000s, 
Kazakh banks began to excessively invest 
abroad due to the favorable credit ratings 
of banks caused by high commodity prices 
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and the lack of local funding. During 
the financial crisis, the quality of banks 
assets was questioned and Kazakhstan’s 
economy was threatened with a recession; 
thus the Samruk-Kazyna Fund was cre-
ated in order to avoid a crisis in the nation. 
This Fund issued securities that were sold 
to the National Fund in order to increase 
domestic investment and reduce reliance 
on foreign funds.
 Unlike the other two nations studied in 
this paper, Kazakhstan has been experi-
encing pronounced economic growth due 
to economic reform and foreign invest-
ment concentrated in the energy sector. 
The majority of this growth has occurred 
starting at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. In 2003, the GINI Index gave Ka-
zakhstan a score of 31.5, which improved 
to reach 26.7 in 2009, relatively low rates 
compared to Venzuela’s 41 and Nigeria’s 
43.7.42 
 Despite the avoidance of the economic 
effects of the resource curse, Kazakhstan 
has still fallen victim to the corruption 
that can be caused by the massive rev-
enues oil exploitation brings in. James 
Giffen is an American merchant banker 
who in 2003 was accused of overseeing the 
issue of bribes from oil companies such 
as Exxon Mobil, BP, and ConocoPhillips 
to the Kazakhstan government in return 
for access to oil reserves. In violation of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 
Mr. Giffen was alleged to have been paid 
tens of millions of dollars for negotiating 
deals between the American oil compa-
nies and the Kazakh government and 
also transmitted over $60 million in the 
mid-1990s to secret bank accounts man-
aged by both President Nazarbayev and 
Nurlan Balgimbaev, the former prime 
minister and oil minister of Kazakhstan.43 
However, Giffen’s defense claims that in 
his job as economic advisor the President 
Nazarbayev the American was working 
under the approval of senior officials in 
Washington. Although both the Ameri-
can government and the oil companies 
have denied any connection to Giffen’s 
illegal dealings, this case shows that the 
corruption in Kazakhstan is caused by oil 
revenues and demonstrates the possibility 
of corruption in foreign nations.44 Years 
later in 2007, UK banker Robert Kissin 
was accused of playing the part of the 
middleman who helped Texas oil service 
company Baker Hughes pay $4 million in 
bribes to the Kazakhstani government in 
exchange for an oil contract.45
 Kazakhstan has suffered the least from 
the paradox of plenty. For the most part 
it has had positive economic growth and 
the government has invested heavily in the 
welfare of its population. The creation of 
the National Fund has shown to be very 
effective at saving rents for the future and 
demonstrates long-term thinking, rather 
than the short-term rent seeking behavior 
of the previous two countries examined. 
The largest problem that Kazakhstan suf-
fers from is the corruption present in both 
its government and the international oil 
companies operating in the area, with 
much evidence of bribes being given to 
officials and even President Nazarbayev for 
lucrative concession contracts. One reason 
that Kazakhstan has suffered from the 
resource on a lesser degree than Venezuela 
and Nigeria could be the country’s late 
arrival to the oil trade. Kazakhstan did 
not fully become an oil-exporting country 
until its independence in 1991. This means 
that it had the time to observe other oil 
exporting countries’ strategies of the pre-
vious century and perhaps avoid the same 
economic and political mistakes that had 
send others spiraling down through the 
paradox of plenty.
Finding an Antidote 
When looking to the future, it is impera-
tive that these countries quickly learn 
to better manage oil revenues with full 
transparency and accountability in order 
to keep up with increasing world demand 
without falling victim to the resource 
curse. A measure that would be effective at 
keeping the resource curse at bay would be 
managerial independence for state-owned 
oil companies. Today, many of the mem-
bers of the oil industry are also govern-
ment officials; in fact, the head of Venezu-
ela’s PDVSA is also the Minister of Energy 
and Petroleum.46 This encourages rent-
seeking behavior, as there is easier access 
for the government to oil revenues because 
of close political connections. By eliminat-
ing the clear governmental influence in 
the oil industry, rent-seeking behavior will 
decrease, as the oil rents will then be part 
of a private industry with commercial in-
terests. Hiring should be merit-based and 
market-driven to encourage true competi-
tion for recognition in the industry.
 There are also many international 
organizations that have been formed in 
order to encourage transparency and bet-
ter economic management of revenues by 
oil-exporting countries. One such group 
is the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, or EITI, which was launched 
in 2002 at the World Summit for Sus-
tainable Development and is the major 
international force behind the urging for 
transparency in revenues and government 
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The largest problem that Kazakhstan 
suffers from is the corruption present in 
both its government and the international 
oil companies operating in the area
accountability from the extractive indus-
tries.47 The principles of this organization 
promote the use of “natural resource 
wealth [as] an important engine for sus-
tainable economic growth that contributes 
to sustainable development and poverty 
reduction.”48 One may become a candidate 
country by fulfilling five requirements 
including implementation of EITI ideals, 
and may become a compliant country after 
a validation period. Out of the nations 
studied in this paper, so far Nigeria is the 
only compliant country, but Kazakhstan is 
on its way, having become a candidate in 
2010.
Conclusion
Venezuela, Nigeria and Kazakhstan have 
much to look to in the future. All three of 
these countries are currently among the 
highest world exporters and producers of 
oil and their output has the potential to 
increase in the decades to come. However, 
before any of these nations can reach full 
production capacity, they must overcome 
the resource curse. This will be slightly 
easier for Kazakhstan, who has learned 
from those before it and seems to suffer 
from elite corruption rather than the nega-
tive economic growth and inequalities 
seen in Venezuela and Nigeria. The latter 
two represent more extreme cases; Vene-
zuela and Nigeria have both been victim to 
many coups and riots that have been inter-
twined with the politics of the oil industry. 
There exist huge gaps between the living 
situations of the rich and the poor, which 
the falling economies and the intense gov-
ernment control over the oil industry only 
worsens. These countries must reconcile 
their aspirations to reap the benefits of oil 
wealth with the sensible ideals of profit 
maximization if they are to rid themselves 
of the resource curse.
43
Striations 
Gina Mason
When looking to the future, it is imperative 
that these countries quickly learn to better 
manage oil revenues with full transparency 
and accountability in order to keep up with 
increasing world demand without falling 
victim to the resource curse. 
